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Is it time for a UN Treaty on Violence against Women? 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Violence against women is one of the most prevalent human rights abuses at the global 
level.  However, no specific mention of this issue is made in any of the UN treaties.  This 
article begins by discussing why any express reference to violence against women was 
excluded from the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women (CEDAW), and then proceeds to examine existing efforts at the UN level 
in this area.  The key focus of this article however is on the new and important question of 
whether it is now time for a specific treaty on violence against women to be adopted at the 
UN level.  The article analyses the arguments surrounding the adoption of a global treaty 
on violence against women, and aims to provide a detailed examination of this highly 
significant area of law, while seeking to offer original insights on this issue.   
 
Keywords 
 
Violence against women; United Nations; UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination against Women; UN Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its 
causes and consequences; Domestic violence.   
 
 
Violence against women occurs in every state worldwide and constitutes one of the most 
prevalent human rights abuses at the global level.  However, none of the UN treaties refers 
specifically to violence against women.  This fact is all the more surprising given that since 
1979 a ‘women’s convention’, the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women (also known as CEDAW), has been in existence.  This 
article will begin by discussing why any express reference to violence against women was 
excluded from CEDAW, and will then proceed to examine how the monitoring body of 
CEDAW, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (also 
known as the CEDAW Committee) has nevertheless sought to include the issue of violence 
against women within its remit by interpreting various provisions of the Convention in 
such a manner as to encompass this issue.  Other UN bodies have also addressed the subject 
of violence against women, for example the UN General Assembly has passed Resolutions 
on the topic, including the very important Declaration on the Elimination of Violence 
against Women (also known as DEVAW).  Most notably the office of the UN Special 
Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences was created in 1994. 
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The key focus of this article is on the question of whether it is now time for a 
specific treaty on violence against women to be adopted at the UN level.  This issue has 
been brought particularly to the fore due to comments made by Rashida Manjoo, who held 
the office of UN Special Rapporteur on violence against women from 2009 until 2015.  In 
a number of statements made both during and after her tenure as Special Rapporteur, 
Manjoo has vociferously expressed her strong belief that a UN treaty on violence against 
women is essential to addressing this issue sufficiently.  Although Manjoo’s successor to 
the office of Special Rapporteur, Dubravka Šimonović, has in her reports to date expressed 
no personal views on this issue, she has nevertheless called for submissions from 
stakeholders on the question of whether there is a need for a separate legally binding treaty 
on violence against women with a separate monitoring body.1  This article will examine in 
detail the arguments surrounding the adoption of a global treaty on violence against 
women.   
 
The omission of violence against women from CEDAW       
 
CEDAW was adopted in 1979 by the UN General Assembly, and entered into force in 
1981.  The Convention essentially defines what constitutes discrimination against women 
and sets out what national action should be taken to end such discrimination.2  In article 1 
of CEDAW, discrimination against women is defined as, 
any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the 
effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise 
by women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and 
women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, 
social, cultural, civil or any other field. 
Although CEDAW has been described as an international bill of rights for women, it is 
important to remember that the Convention is primarily focused on combating 
discrimination against women, as opposed to securing the rights of women in a more 
substantive manner.  The aim of the Convention is to ensure that women are treated equally 
to men across a wide range of areas, such as political and public life, education and 
employment.   
 
Violence against women has now been recognised by other authorities on 
international human rights law as an issue falling within the ambit of equality and anti-
discrimination provisions.  For example, in a number of recent cases, the European Court 
of Human Rights (ECtHR) has found breaches of the article 14 equality provision of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) in situations involving female victims of 
domestic violence.3  However, an anti-discrimination framework is perhaps not the first 
discourse which comes to mind when considering violence against women, and indeed to 
approach this issue purely as one of discrimination would not capture the essence of the 
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problem.   Instead, more substantive rights, such as the right to bodily integrity; the right 
to be free from inhuman and degrading treatment; the right to be free from torture; and in 
some cases even the right to life itself, seem to be more appropriate.  Nevertheless, the 
focus of CEDAW was not primarily on any of these rights, but on the anti-discrimination 
discourse.  Given this approach, it is perhaps less remarkable that this instrument does not 
expressly encompass the issue of violence against women. 
 
Another reason for the omission of violence against women from CEDAW lies in 
the simple fact that this instrument was adopted almost four decades ago.  It seems that 
during the drafting process there was relatively little discussion of the possible inclusion 
of violence against women.  Although the Belgian delegation proposed that the provision 
which later became Article 64 should be drafted to include ‘attacks on the physical integrity 
of women’, this proposal was withdrawn due to a lack of support.5  Understandings of 
various aspects of the phenomenon of violence against women have nevertheless 
developed enormously since 1979.  For example, although one of the most prevalent forms 
of violence against women is violence taking place in the home, it was only in the 1970s 
that domestic violence was even recognised as constituting a significant social problem,6 
let alone an issue which needed be tackled by legal measures at the domestic level.  As 
Burton remarks, ‘Until the 1970s there was little recognition of domestic violence as an 
issue that ought to be tackled by the legal system’.7  It took even longer for violence against 
women to be recognised as an issue for international law.  As Edwards states, ‘Prior to the 
1990s…violence against women was not seen as a major issue, and if it was recognised as 
an issue at all, it was considered an issue for national governments (and criminal law) rather 
than international law.’8  It is therefore unsurprising that no express reference to violence 
against women is to be found in CEDAW. 
 
The approach of the CEDAW Committee to violence against women 
 
Despite the omission from CEDAW of any express provisions on violence against women, 
the CEDAW Committee has nevertheless interpreted the Convention in such a manner as 
to encompass this issue.  In 1989 the CEDAW Committee issued its General 
Recommendation No. 12.9  Although this Recommendation was very short, it asserted that 
states parties to CEDAW should include in their periodic reports to the CEDAW 
Committee information relating to the legislation in force to protect women from all types 
of violence in everyday life;10 other measures in place to eradicate such violence;11 the 
existence of support services for women who are victims of aggression or abuses;12 and 
statistical data on the incidence of violence of all types against women.13  It is nonetheless 
notable that General Recommendation No. 12 did not actually explain precisely how 
violence against women was encompassed by CEDAW.14  It merely stated that articles 2, 
5, 11, 12 and 16 of the Convention required states parties ‘to act to protect women against 
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violence of any kind occurring within the family, at the work place or in any other area of 
social life’.  However, given that none of these provisions contain any express mention 
whatsoever of violence against women, this statement was vague to say the least. 
 
Three years after its issuing of General Recommendation No. 12, the CEDAW 
Committee produced General Recommendation No. 19, which was a great deal more 
precise.  General Recommendation No. 19 asserted that, ‘Gender-based violence is a form 
of discrimination that seriously inhibits women's ability to enjoy rights and freedoms on a 
basis of equality with men’, 15  and that, ‘The full implementation of the Convention 
required States to take positive measures to eliminate all forms of violence against 
women.’16  The General Recommendation went on to state that,  
The definition of discrimination includes gender-based violence, that is, violence 
that is directed against a woman because she is a woman or that affects women 
disproportionately.  It includes acts that inflict physical, mental or sexual harm or 
suffering, threats of such acts, coercion and other deprivations of liberty.  Gender-
based violence may breach specific provisions of the Convention, regardless of 
whether those provisions expressly mention violence.17 
 
General Recommendation No. 19 then proceeded to set out how various provisions 
of CEDAW, although not expressly mentioning violence against women, should 
nevertheless be interpreted in such a manner as to encompass this issue.18  The document 
concluded by making a number of specific recommendations to states regarding their 
responses to violence against women.  For example, states parties should take appropriate 
and effective measures to overcome all forms of gender-based violence, whether by public 
or private acts; they should ensure that laws against gender-based violence give adequate 
protection to all women, and respect their integrity and dignity; and they should ensure that 
appropriate protective and support services are provided for victims. Gender-sensitive 
training of judicial and law enforcement officers and other public officials should also be 
implemented.  In addition, states parties should encourage the compilation of statistics and 
the carrying out of research on the extent, causes and effects of violence, and on the 
effectiveness of measures to prevent and address such violence.  States parties should also 
adopt effective measures to overcome attitudes, customs and practices that perpetuate 
violence against women.19   
 
Using the interpretation of CEDAW put forward in General Recommendation No. 
19, the CEDAW Committee frequently makes recommendations relating to violence 
against women in its Concluding Observations on the reports submitted by states under 
CEDAW’s monitoring procedure.20  In addition, under the individual communications 
procedure found in the Optional Protocol to CEDAW, the Committee has found states to 
be in breach of the Convention in situations relating to violence against women and has in 
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these instances made recommendations as to how the states in question should respond to 
these findings and rectify the situations in question.21  The CEDAW Committee works very 
much from the assumption that, given the interpretation put forward in General 
Recommendation No. 19, CEDAW without doubt applies to violence against women.  
 
Other work at the UN level on violence against women 
 
In addition, it is notable that consideration of the issue of violence against women is not 
limited only to the CEDAW Committee.  It is undoubtedly the case that a substantial 
amount of activity occurs at the UN level on the issue of violence against women.  For 
example, the UN General Assembly has passed Resolutions on this subject, including the 
very important UN Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women, in which 
the General Assembly referred to the rights to life; to equality; to liberty and security of 
person; to equal protection under the law; to be free from all forms of discrimination; to 
the highest standard attainable of physical and mental health; to just and favourable 
conditions of work; and not to be subjected to torture, or other cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment.22   Resolutions relating to violence against women were also 
issued by the Commission on Human Rights,23 and have been issued by the Human Rights 
Council which replaced the Commission on Human Rights in 2006.24 In addition, violence 
against women was addressed in the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action which 
was adopted by the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna on 25 June 1993.  
Indeed the importance which is accorded by the UN bodies to this subject is seen in the 
very existence of the office of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women.  Since 
the inception of this post in 1994, those who have held the office have issued a multitude 
of detailed reports.  In addition, the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action which was 
issued following the fourth world conference on women organised by the UN, which took 
place in 1995, contained detailed recommendations on the measures which states should 
adopt to address violence against women.25 
 
Given the extensive consideration of violence against women which is afforded by 
the CEDAW Committee and also other UN bodies, the question arises of whether a treaty 
on violence against women is really needed?   
 
The non-binding nature of current UN statements on violence against women – 
problems of principle 
Violence against women is one of the most widespread human rights abuses at the global 
level.  As Edwards comments, ‘The statistics are staggering and indicate that the 
phenomenon of violence against women is universal in scope.’26  The responses of states 
to this issue are in many cases extremely problematic.  The report of a comprehensive study 
carried out by the UN in 2015 stated that, ‘Not all countries have laws on violence against 
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women, and when they do, they are often more concerned with responding to the violence 
that has already occurred than with preventing it in the first place.’27  A 2016 report issued 
by the current UN Special Rapporteur on violence against women stated that national 
implementation of existing international standards on violence against women ‘has 
generally been fragmented, and often without a coordinated or comprehensive system to 
combat and prevent violence against women on the basis of a solid legal and institutional 
framework.’28  In its Concluding Observations on state reports, the CEDAW Committee 
regularly highlights problems with state responses to gender based violence.29  Research 
carried out on how a sample of states have responded to the comments of the CEDAW 
Committee on the issue of domestic violence found that the majority of the states surveyed 
were complying with only some of the Committee’s recommendations.30  The enormity of 
the issue of violence against women, together with the immense deficiencies which are 
currently characteristic of state responses and the fact that in reality there are no legally 
binding treaty provisions at the international level which address this issue, appears to 
constitute the over-riding argument in favour of the adoption of a UN treaty on violence 
against women.   
Even though a multitude of statements have been issued by the CEDAW 
Committee and by other UN bodies, these all fall within the category of ‘soft law’ which 
is non-binding on states.  Even General Recommendation No. 19 itself, on which the 
CEDAW Committee bases much of its work on violence against women, is in strict legal 
terms only a non-binding interpretation of CEDAW.  It appears unacceptable from the 
perspective of principle that there are no legally binding international provisions on this 
issue.  Rehman remarks that, ‘A serious criticism of the Women’s Convention has been the 
absence of specific provisions condemning violence against women, an omission which is 
unacceptable in the light of everyday instances of violence against women in every region 
of the world.’31  When CEDAW was adopted in 1979 the prevalence and nature of violence 
against women was not understood to any great extent.  However, since then there have 
been enormous developments in the understanding of this phenomenon, and it now seems 
no longer tenable for the lack of international treaty provisions on violence against women 
to remain unaddressed.  
At present it appears that one almost has to twist CEDAW in order to attempt to 
make this instrument encompass the issue of gender-based violence.  In an interview which 
Rashida Manjoo gave in May 2015, she commented that,  
The functioning of the (CEDAW) Committee regarding violence against women is 
to try and fit this pervasive human rights violation under the discrimination label, 
and to then find ways to justify the Committee’s jurisdiction by using other 
provisions in the CEDAW.  When it receives a complaint, or when it interrogates 
the state parties reports, it does what I call jurisdictional gymnastics to address the 
issue of violence against women. It has to ask questions such as: Is violence against 
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women discrimination? Is the violence due to stereotyping? Is it due to family 
relations?32 
Of course, it must be remembered that the stretching of human rights instruments is not 
uncommon.  For example, although the ECHR was originally designed for use by adults in 
resisting state power, this instrument is now frequently applied in instances in which the 
rights of one individual have been violated by another private entity.33  Nevertheless, it 
appears that the adoption of a global treaty on violence against women would add 
substantially more force to the statements made by the CEDAW Committee and the other 
UN human rights bodies as regards this issue.   
 
The non-binding nature of current UN statements on violence against women – 
problems in practice 
 
It is relatively easy to see why the absence of international legally binding treaty provisions 
on violence against women is problematic from a perspective of theory or principle, as 
discussed above.  Nevertheless, arguably the even more crucial question is whether the 
omission of such provisions is also problematic from a practical perspective.  The CEDAW 
Committee currently requires that all states parties to CEDAW report on their laws, policies 
and practices in the area of violence against women and is fairly consistent in making 
recommendations to states that hold them accountable to General Recommendation 19.  If 
a treaty on violence against women were adopted, it is very possible that the monitoring 
body of such a treaty may produce similar statements to those currently being made by the 
CEDAW Committee.  As the recommendations of any new treaty monitoring body would 
still constitute ‘soft law’, would the fact that the actual standards themselves would be 
legally binding make a difference in practice?  It is true that no definitive answer can be 
given to the question of whether the rate of compliance of states would necessarily improve 
if there were a treaty in place, and in the absence of such a treaty any discussion must be 
speculative only.  It must also be remembered that all of the existing UN human rights 
treaties suffer from substantial problems as regards their implementation and 
enforcement.34  In addition, it is notable that the CEDAW Committee is of the view that 
the existence of General Recommendation 19 is sufficient and that there is thus no 
necessity for a treaty on violence against women.35   
 
Conversely however, the former UN Special Rapporteur on violence against 
women, Rashida Manjoo, makes a compelling case for the need for legally binding 
standards on gender-based violence, based upon her own experiences as Special 
Rapporteur.  In a report of May 2014 she stated that, ‘although soft laws may be influential 
in developing norms, their non-binding nature effectively means that states cannot be held 
responsible for violations’.  She proceeded to note that ‘none of the soft law developments 
on violence against women has moved into the realm of customary international law as 
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yet.’36  Since then Manjoo has made various statements in which she strongly expresses 
her view that the adoption of a legally binding treaty at the international level is an absolute 
necessity in order for states to be held accountable as regards their responses to violence 
against women.  For example, in a report of September 2014 she stated that,  
Although many States have acknowledged violence against women as a widespread 
and systematic human rights violation and are working on eradicating it, to differing 
degrees at the national level, the normative gap within international human rights 
law as regards violence against women is a barrier to holding States accountable 
for the failure to respect, protect and fulfil the human rights of women.37   
In a similar vein, the primary focus of Manjoo’s final report as Special Rapporteur was on 
the necessity for the adoption of a UN treaty on violence against women.  In this report she 
asserted that, 
The normative gap under international human rights law raises crucial questions 
about the State responsibility to act with due diligence and the responsibility of the 
State as the ultimate duty bearer to protect women and girls from violence, its 
causes and consequences…Given the systemic, widespread and pervasive nature of 
this human rights violation, which is experienced largely by women because they 
are women, a different set of normative and practical measures to respond to, 
prevent and ultimately eliminate such violence is crucial.38 
Such strong statements on the need to adopt a UN treaty on violence against women should 
not be lightly disregarded, however does it truly make a difference whether standards are 
‘soft law’ or legally binding? 
 
The utility of ‘soft law’, relative to legally binding standards, is an issue which has 
attracted some debate.39  It seems that although soft law can certainly be beneficial, 
it is also clear that, from earliest times, states and other social actors have found it 
useful to draw a relatively sharp distinction between norms and normative 
arrangements that are meant to be binding, backed up by the organized 
community’s authority, and those that are not.40   
O’Connell states that, ‘despite all of its utility, soft law is not confused with hard law; the 
aim of most in global governance is to get enforceable hard law obligations.’41  Cassel 
comments that, ‘Formally obligatory international norms can legitimize and fortify the 
organizing and consciousness-raising efforts of non-governmental organizations.’42  As 
Bilder remarks, ‘there remains a widely-held and long understood assumption in all 
societies that there is a meaningful difference between norms that are intended to be legally 
binding and those that are not, and that people may rely on this difference’ (original 
italics).43  Shelton comments that, ‘In the long run…non-binding norms in human rights 
are generally not as effective as binding commitments and the enforcement possibilities 
that come with them for victims and their representatives.’44  Simmons states that,  
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Treaties are the clearest statements available about the content of globally 
sanctioned decent rights practices…Treaties serve notice that governments are 
accountable – domestically and externally – for refraining from the abuses 
proscribed by their own mutual agreements.  Treaties signal a seriousness of intent 
that is difficult to replicate in other ways.45   
It seems that it does therefore make a difference whether the standards applicable to a 
particular issue are legally binding, as opposed to being ‘soft law’.     
 
The merits of an international approach 
 
However, is the issue of violence against women best dealt with at the global level or is a 
regional approach more advantageous?  In 2011 the Council of Europe adopted a 
Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic 
Violence (the Istanbul Convention).  In addition, within the Inter-American system of 
human rights protection, the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment 
and Eradication of Violence against Women (the Convention of Belém do Pará), was 
adopted as far back as 1994.  Also, the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (the Maputo Protocol), which was 
adopted by the African Union in 2003, contains provisions relevant to violence against 
women.  Is this issue therefore best addressed by regional instruments such as these?   
 
 The existence of regional standards on violence against women is certainly 
meritorious, and it is possible that regional instruments may have advantages over 
international treaties as regards enforcement.  As Smith remarks, ‘There may be a greater 
political will to conform to regional texts as they are sometimes seen as being of more 
immediate concern than the international initiatives.’46  However, the fact that there are a 
number of legally binding provisions on violence against women within the context of 
regional systems of human rights protection does not in itself automatically eliminate the 
need for a UN treaty on violence against women.  Firstly, there are huge swathes of the 
globe which do not fall within any of the regional systems of human rights protection which 
encompass treaty provisions on this issue.  Also, the regional provisions on violence against 
women which are currently in existence vary dramatically in terms of scope.  For example, 
the Istanbul Convention places extremely extensive and detailed duties on states parties.  
As a new instrument, this treaty was formulated with the benefit of the substantial amount 
of research which has been carried out on violence against women in recent years.  By 
contrast, the Convention of Belém do Pará, which was adopted over two decades ago, 
places far less detailed obligations on states parties.47  In the context of the African Union, 
violence against women is just one of the many issues encompassed by the Maputo 
Protocol, and as such is addressed fairly briefly.  It seems that there is thus a need for a 
uniform set of obligations to be adopted. 
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 It is true that the specific issues relating to violence against women can vary to 
some extent between regions and indeed between states, for example, as regards the 
prevalence of particular types of violence.  As Merry comments, ‘Gender violence occurs 
throughout the world, but it takes quite different forms in different social contexts.’48  
However, gender-based violence, no matter what form it takes, tends to be rooted in the 
same concepts – those of power and control.  Also, to argue that violence against women 
is an issue which it is more appropriate to address at a regional level runs a substantial risk 
of straying into the problematic realms of cultural relativism.  ‘Arguments about preserving 
culture become the basis for defending male control over women.’49  Human rights are 
universal, and universal standards on violence against women must therefore be applied.  
This set of standards could of course be supplemented if necessary by further regional 
instruments if there are issues which are particularly problematic in certain areas. 
 
What form should be taken by a global treaty on violence against women? 
 
If it is accepted that legally binding standards on violence against women are needed at the 
global level, the next question which arises relates to the form which such standards should 
take.  Two options appear to present themselves.  The first is the adoption of an Optional 
Protocol to CEDAW on violence against women.50  The second is the adoption of a stand-
alone treaty on violence against women.  As regards the first option, the adoption of an 
Optional Protocol to CEDAW on this issue to be monitored by the CEDAW Committee 
may have certain attractions, in that this course of action is likely to be substantially less 
costly than the adoption of a stand-alone treaty and the establishment of a separate 
monitoring body.  In addition, this approach would carry less of a reporting burden for 
states, in that states parties to such a Protocol could include information on compliance 
within their reports to the CEDAW Committee on compliance with CEDAW more 
generally.  This may in turn have the advantage of encouraging more states to ratify such 
an instrument.  It is also notable that the CEDAW Committee has expressed concern that 
a new instrument with its own monitoring body would increase the burden on states and 
would also have cost implications.51   Adopting an Optional Protocol to CEDAW, as 
opposed to a stand-alone treaty, would assist in alleviating such concerns. 
 
However, the adoption of an Optional Protocol to CEDAW, as opposed to a stand-
alone treaty, may also have significant disadvantages.  All of the UN treaty bodies, 
including the CEDAW Committee, already work under substantial pressure.  It does not 
seem realistic to expect the CEDAW Committee to take on the additional monitoring 
burdens which would be entailed by the adoption of a Protocol on violence against women.  
Indeed it is possible that such a course of action could result in the responses of states to 
their obligations under such a Protocol being under-scrutinised, due simply to a lack of 
capacity on the part of the CEDAW Committee.  By contrast, the adoption of a stand-alone 
 11
treaty on violence against women with its own monitoring body would allow for much 
more detailed scrutiny of state responses.   
 
 In terms of the substantive provisions which such an instrument should contain, as 
with any treaty, this would clearly be a matter for extensive debate.  Nevertheless, the 
provisions of the Istanbul Convention could act as a beneficial starting point, given their 
extensive and detailed nature.52  It is likely that the monitoring mechanisms of a UN treaty 
on violence against women would follow broadly the same form as those of the other UN 
human rights treaties, with a reporting mechanism constituting the primary method of 
monitoring compliance, along with a (potentially optional) communications mechanism 
and inquiry procedure.  There are however a number of innovative measures relevant to 
monitoring which have been adopted under the more recent UN human rights treaties, such 
as the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD),53 which may 
also be advantageous in the context of a treaty on violence against women.  For example, 
under article 36(2) of the CRPR, if a report is ‘significantly overdue’, the Committee on 
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities may give the state party a three-month notice to 
submit a report.  Another innovation relates to the Conference of States Parties.  Article 40 
of the CRPD provides for periodic meetings of states parties to assess the implementation 
of the Convention.  While previous human rights treaties do refer to meetings of states 
parties, these mechanisms are intended to be used for purposes relevant to the election of 
Committee members or amendments to the treaties in question, as opposed to wider 
functions.  Such meetings in the context of the CRPD are meant to facilitate 
implementation by drawing together a broad range of actors, including states parties, non-
governmental organisations and relevant UN agencies, in order to discuss how best to 
ensure the implementation of the CRPD.54     
  
A gendered approach versus gender neutrality           
 
A possible argument which could be mooted against a global treaty on violence against 
women may lie in the very nature of such an instrument.  Could it be claimed that a treaty 
addressing violence against women would in itself constitute discrimination against men?  
In recent years there has been a move towards gender neutrality in relation to the 
approaches adopted by some jurisdictions, for example England and Wales, to issues such 
as domestic violence.  For instance, the current cross-governmental definition of domestic 
violence which was adopted by the Home Office in March 2013 is entirely gender neutral.55  
The concept of a UN treaty on violence against women does not fit easily with such 
approaches and this may indeed deter states which prefer to adopt a gender neutral 
perspective from ratifying such a treaty.   
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 Nevertheless, are gender neutral approaches sufficient or does the specific nature 
of violence against women call for a different response?  Gender neutral approaches in this 
area have received strong criticism from Rashida Manjoo.  For example, in her September 
2014 report to the UN General Assembly, she stated that, 
The concept of gender neutrality is framed in a way that understands violence as a 
threat to which all are potentially vulnerable and from which all deserve protection.  
This suggests that male victims of violence require, and deserve, comparable 
resources to those afforded to female victims, thereby ignoring the reality that 
violence against men does not occur as a result of pervasive inequality and 
discrimination, and also that it is neither systemic nor pandemic in the way that 
violence against women indisputably is.56 
 
 The issue of whether approaches to issues such as domestic violence should be 
based on a gendered or gender neutral perspective has been debated extensively. 57  
However, it seems that a strong case can be made for the merits of a gendered approach.  
For example, as regards violence taking place in the home, Dobash and Dobash argue that 
priority should be given to policies which address men’s violence against women, given 
that women’s violence against men differs substantially from men’s violence against 
women in terms of the context and the consequences.58  Women’s violence frequently 
occurs in the context of self-defence and the consequences of women’s violence against 
men are less severe.  As Burton comments, ‘Women’s violence towards male intimate 
partners does not occur with the same frequency or ferocity as men’s violence towards 
female intimate partners.’59  In a similar vein, Chinkin remarks that, ‘while men also 
experience domestic violence, it is more frequently inflicted upon women and has disparate 
economic and social consequences’.60   
 
 Notably, it is unlikely that the UN bodies would have any difficulty with a treaty 
on violence against women on the grounds of potential gender-based discrimination.  
CEDAW itself is focused only on discrimination against women – discrimination against 
men is not contemplated by this treaty.  Likewise the treatment of, for example, domestic 
violence by the UN bodies conceptualises this issue simply as a form of violence against 
women – violence against men in the home has not been considered by any of the UN 
bodies to any substantive extent.  This of course does not assume that the correct approach 
has been adopted by the UN in this regard.  Domestic violence against men is an important 
issue and one which should not be forgotten.61  Although the focus of this article is 
essentially on violence against women, it is accepted that UN treaty provisions on domestic 
violence could encompass male victims also.62            
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Would states ratify a UN treaty on violence against women?  
 
Perhaps one of the most fundamental questions relating to whether a UN treaty on violence 
against women should be adopted, is the very practical issue of would a significant number 
of states choose to ratify such an instrument?63  It is of course impossible to reach a 
definitive answer to this question, and any analysis of the likelihood of states ratifying such 
a treaty can only be speculative.  Nevertheless, it is notable that the large majority of states 
within the Council of Europe have to date either ratified the Istanbul Convention or have 
indicated their intention to do so by signing this instrument.64  In addition, the Convention 
of Belém do Pará is the most widely ratified convention within the Inter-American 
system.65  The favourable responses by states to both of the regional conventions on 
violence against women seems to indicate that a large number of states may in fact be 
willing to ratify a global treaty on violence against women.           
   
 The degree of willingness among states to ratify a UN treaty on violence against 
women would clearly depend greatly on the nature of the obligations to be found therein.  
The more onerous these obligations, the less likely it is that states would ratify.  However, 
it would of course be necessary to ensure that the provisions of such an instrument were 
not too weak as to be ineffective.  In drafting any such treaty, a very careful balance would 
therefore need to be struck in this regard. 
 
 Another important issue is that of resources.  Addressing violence against women 
effectively clearly requires expenditure of state resources.  For example, a number of the 
measures found in the Istanbul Convention, such as those relating to the support services 
which should be made available to victims,66 require states to expend substantial levels of 
resources.  However many of the wealthiest states globally can be found in Europe.  
Including similar obligations in a global treaty on violence against women may result in 
low rates of ratification.  The governments of many states may feel that they simply do not 
have sufficient resources to comply with such duties.  It was an understanding of the low 
levels of resources of many states globally which led to the concept of ‘progressive 
realisation’ being included in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR), under which ratification does not mean that states must immediately 
comply with all of the provisions of this instrument.  Instead, states are under a duty to 
realise their obligations progressively, in accordance with available monetary resources.67  
Nevertheless, as regards an issue such as violence against women, would a treaty which 
did not, for example, place duties on states to provide sufficient social support measures 
for victims be meaningful?  In relation to violence against women taking place in the home, 
it is often measures of social support which are of most importance to victims.68  Likewise, 
if such obligations were encompassed in a global treaty and the concept of progressive 
realisation were also included, would this dilute these duties to such an extent as to make 
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them ineffective?  These are difficult questions to which there are no straightforward 
answers.       
 
 Another issue relating to the likelihood of states ratifying a UN treaty on violence 
against women lies in the question of what approach would be taken towards reservations 
in any such treaty.  Although CEDAW is one of the most widely ratified of the UN treaties, 
it is also the treaty to which the most reservations, and indeed the most extensive 
reservations, have been entered by states parties.  These reservations are widely regarded 
as being immensely problematic, but the approach which was adopted in this regard was 
that it was preferable to allow states to ratify CEDAW with extensive reservations rather 
than such states not ratifying the Convention at all.69  If a substantial number of states were 
only persuaded to ratify CEDAW due to the fact that they were permitted to enter extensive 
reservations, it may be unlikely that such states would ratify a treaty on violence against 
women without similarly being allowed to enter substantive reservations.  Nonetheless, 
would the permitting of such reservations again dilute such an instrument so as to make it 
of little practical value?  Again this is a key question which would necessitate detailed 
consideration prior to the adoption of any global treaty on violence against women. 
 
Potential problems with duplication        
 
From the perspective of states parties to the UN human rights treaties, it is undeniable that 
the reporting requirements are time-consuming and costly.  If a state is party to a number 
of such instruments, and is required to provide a report on compliance to each of the 
relevant treaty monitoring bodies every four years, this constitutes a substantial obligation.  
This may raise the question of whether states should therefore be placed under greater 
pressure in this regard by the addition of yet another treaty in respect of which reports must 
be provided.  If a UN treaty on violence against women were to be adopted, questions 
would also be raised as to how the obligations to be undertaken by states under such an 
instrument would relate to the work of the CEDAW Committee on this issue.  States 
include information on the steps which they take to combat violence against women in the 
reports which they submit to the CEDAW Committee, which in turn makes 
recommendations on this issue in its Concluding Observations.  If a state ratified a UN 
treaty on violence against women, would the state be obliged to provide information on 
violence against women to a new treaty monitoring body and also, perhaps in a less detailed 
format, to the CEDAW Committee?  Conversely, if such an instrument were to be adopted 
by the UN, would this encourage states which choose not to ratify it but which are parties 
to CEDAW to argue that they should not be subject to scrutiny by the CEDAW Committee 
on the issue of violence against women as they have chosen not to ratify the UN treaty on 
this matter?  In its response to the current Special Rapporteur’s call for submissions on 
whether there is a need for a separate legally binding treaty on violence against women, 
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the CEDAW Committee itself stated that, ‘A new instrument and its new monitoring body 
would certainly increase the burden of States parties and reinforce the trend of 
fragmentation.’70    
 
  It is certainly true that the CEDAW Committee makes valiant attempts to address 
the issue of violence against women.  As discussed previously, the Committee regularly 
makes recommendations to states on this matter in its Concluding Observations on state 
reports.  Nevertheless, the problem is that violence against women is only one of a 
multitude of issues which need to be addressed by the CEDAW Committee in relation to 
each state report which is presented.  As was also mentioned previously, the Committee 
works under extreme time pressures and has only a relatively short time to consider each 
report.  This means that the time which can be spent on the consideration of violence 
against women is very limited, a situation which is particularly problematic given the 
complex and multi-faceted nature of this issue.  In her report of May 2014 to the UN Human 
Rights Council, Manjoo commented that, 
Despite the existence of interpretative guidelines and monitoring by human rights 
treaty bodies…the limitations of large and varied mandates, coupled with time 
constraints when examining State party reports, result in insufficient interrogation 
concerning the information relating to violence against women, its causes and 
consequences, and insufficient assessment of responses.71   
 
 One of the key advantages of a global treaty on violence against women would be 
that it would enable the monitoring body of such an instrument to focus in an exclusive 
and in-depth manner on this particular area, and to make detailed recommendations to 
states on this issue.  Although it is probable that states which are parties to both a UN treaty 
on violence against women and to CEDAW would still be required to include information 
on their responses to violence against women in their periodic reports to the CEDAW 
Committee, it is very unlikely that this would constitute any real inconvenience for such 
states.72  Also, it is arguable that a lex specialis approach should be adopted in such a case, 
whereby a state party to both CEDAW and a UN treaty on violence against women should 
be allowed to focus on its obligations under the latter, before having to think about 
complying with overlapping obligations under a lex generalis such as CEDAW.    
 
Other Options 
 
Although this article has focused on the adoption of new legally binding provisions at the 
UN level on violence against women, should such a course of action lack the requisite level 
of support, it is recognised that there are other options which could also contribute to 
improved rates of compliance in this area.  As referred to previously, the majority of 
women’s experiences of violence are constituted by domestic abuse, therefore a new 
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convention addressing even this issue alone would have the potential to be beneficial.  Such 
an instrument could encompass all victims of domestic violence, including male victims, 
an approach which may be preferred by states and which would recognise the important 
issue of domestic violence against men.   
 
 Although there are no specific legally binding standards on issues such as domestic 
violence at the global level, the Human Rights Committee has referred to domestic abuse 
in relation to Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 
which states that, ‘No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment’.73  It has been argued that domestic violence can constitute a form 
of torture, 74  and the Committee against Torture has expressed concern in relation to 
domestic abuse. 75   Rather than adopting a set of issue-specific treaty provisions, an 
alternative option may be a convention establishing a UN committee on domestic violence 
and providing for the submission of complaints on this issue within the ambit of the ICCPR, 
the Convention against Torture (CAT) or CEDAW to this committee.  Such a body would 
still be relying on interpretations of the relevant treaty provisions and so technically this 
would not solve the problem of a lack of legally binding treaty provisions in this area.  
However, ratifying such a convention would demonstrate a commitment on the part of 
states to taking steps to address the issue of domestic abuse.  The members of such a 
committee would be experts in this area and the exclusive focus on domestic violence 
would mean that the committee would have sufficient time to consider complaints in an in-
depth manner.         
 Another option may be a convention on domestic violence comparable to the model 
of the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (CPT).  Such an instrument would not create new standards but 
would establish an inspection system and allow a new committee to publish reports 
evaluating how well a state is matching up to what is expected of it in the field of domestic 
violence.  The system established by the CPT is aimed at protecting those deprived of their 
liberty from breaches of their rights to be free from torture and inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment under Article 3 of the ECHR.  Although the CPT does not contain 
any new standards and is simply based on the general Article 3 provision, there is 
nevertheless evidence that this system has had a very beneficial effect on the way criminal 
justice systems treat persons in custody.  As was stated in a paper presented at a conference 
marking 25 years of the operation of the CPT, ‘there are numerous examples of…states 
parties taking CPT reports seriously and implementing concrete measures to remedy the 
problems found.’76  The establishment of a UN committee on domestic violence under this 
model may likewise have a beneficial impact on the responses of states to this issue. 
 Should there be insufficient support for a new treaty however, it would be important 
for the UN Special Rapporteur on violence against women to continue with the approach 
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of conducting detailed investigations of the laws, policies and practices of each state.77  
Such an approach serves to draw attention to the importance of the issue of violence against 
women in each state in question, but without placing any additional reporting or cost 
burdens on states.  Also, such reports by the Special Rapporteur are of particular value as,  
given their sole focus on the issue of violence against women, the recommendations and 
analysis contained therein can be substantially more detailed than the consideration which 
the CEDAW Committee can afford to this issue in the context of Concluding Observations 
on state reports.  
Conclusion 
 
When CEDAW was drafted in 1979, violence against women was simply not an issue on 
the agenda for international human rights law.  However awareness of the extent of this 
issue and of its complex nature has grown enormously in recent years.  If an instrument 
focusing on the rights of women were to be adopted in the present day, it would be 
inconceivable for an issue such as violence against women to be omitted.  Although this 
issue is now clearly on the agenda of UN bodies such as the CEDAW Committee, it seems 
unjustifiable from the perspective of principle that there are still no legally binding 
provisions at the global level on violence against women, and it is submitted that a treaty 
on violence against women would be a desirable development.  
   
 It is acknowledged that the development of such an instrument would not be an 
easy process.  Indeed, there are many issues which would require painstaking examination.  
As referred to previously, all of the UN human rights treaties suffer from substantial 
problems as regards implementation.  This raises the question therefore of how difficulties 
of this nature could be avoided in respect of a UN treaty on violence against women.  It is 
almost certain that the answer is that they could not.  The question which therefore would 
necessitate extensive consideration is how such problems could be minimised as far as 
possible.  Other issues which would require substantial examination include how best to 
strike a balance between on the one hand, making state obligations under such an 
instrument as effective and detailed as possible, and on the other, not making such duties 
so onerous that states would be discouraged from ratifying the treaty.  Nevertheless, 
although there would certainly be many difficult issues to be addressed in the process, it 
seems that a UN treaty on violence against women would have the potential to make a 
significant contribution to the movement to combat such abuse.  Should a new treaty lack 
the requisite level of support however, it is important that existing work at the UN level on 
violence against women be developed and strengthened, such as by the continuation by the 
UN Special Rapporteur on violence against women with the approach of conducting 
detailed investigations of the laws, policies and practices of each state as regards this 
crucial issue.         
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